Colossus: The Price of America's Empire is the "sequel" to Niall Ferguson's Empire.#

Like Empire there is already a large amount of commentary about Ferguson's ideas on the Internet and in the press. It is a popular book and a pressing topic right now. In this summary, I will focus on what I found particular interesting and my own opinions of American Empire.#

An initial note, this book is packed with footnotes, unlike Empire. And in many cases there are whole strings of paragraphs and sections taken directly from Empire or other books (The Cash Nexus) and articles by Ferguson I have read. They aren't out of place, but I find this to be interesting.#

Introduction#

All told, there have been no more than seventy empires in history. If the Times Atlas of World History is to be believed, the American is, by my count, the sixty-eighth. (Communist China is the sixty-ninth; some would claim that the European Union is the seventieth.) How different is the American empire from previous empires? Like the ancient Egyptian, it erects towering edifices in its heartland, though these house the living rather than the dead. Like the Athenian Empire, it has proved itself adept at leading alliances against a rival power. Like the empire of Alexander, it has a staggering geographical range. Like the Chinese Empire that arose in the Ch'in era and reached its zenith under the Ming dynasty, it has united the lands and peoples of a vast territory and forged them into a true nation-state. Like the Roman Empire, it has a system of citizenship that is remarkably open: Purple Hearts and U.S. citizenship were conferred simultaneously on a number of soldiers serving in Iraq last year, just as service in the legions was once a route to becoming a civis romanus. Indeed, with the classical architecture of its capital and the republican structure of its constitution, the United States is perhaps more like a "new Rome" than any previous empire--albeit a Rome in which the Senate has thus far retained its grip on would-be emperors. [Ferguson later says that Rome was over 400 years old when Caesar crossed the Rubicon and America is much younger so it is "too early to tell."]

[...]

To those who would still insist on American "exceptionalism," the historian of empires can only retort: as exceptional as all the other sixty-nine empires. [p. 14-15]

Part I - Rise#

1. The Limits of the American Empire#

One of the ways that Ferguson claims America has always been an empire is the way it has conquered almost the entirety of North America from just the east coast. This was colonial expansion. One of the flaws Ferguson sees in America's Empire is that it could not take this success overseas or further north or south, and refused to when it had a supreme chance. (Mexico in the early 1900s.)

2. The Imperialism of Anti-Imperialism#

In this chapter, as with the last, Ferguson writes about why the Americans are not very good at empire. He resolution is that they have incredibly short time horizons with which they like to see results and they have very low tolerances of casualties; these being so low that they cause confusion with veterans of the British Empire.

He remarks that these can partly be explained by the American "creation myth" about defeating an empire, and with the incredibly short cycles of politics, as discussed in much of Democracy in America by de Tocqueville.

3. The Civilization of Clashes#

This chapter deals in part with terrorism and in particular the attacks of September 2001, an event that Ferguson says "history failed to turn around." (p. 107)

The U.S. economy weathered this blow more easily than many feared at the time. Viewed in strictly economic terms, the attacks of September 11 were comparable with a very severe natural disaster: expensive but affordable, and of much less significance than the deflation of the stock market bubble that had begun a year and half earlier. Compared with the damage that might have been inflicted by the Soviet Union in the event that the cold war had turned hot, they were indeed trivial. Simply because World War III did not happen should not lead us to draw the wrong conclusion that al Qa'eda is more dangerous to the United States than was Soviet communism. [p. 126-127]

Other parts of this chapter are about how "the geographical focus of the American empire shifted repeatedly during the twentieth century."

At the beginning of the century it had been a hemispheric empire, reaching eastward into the Caribbean, southward into Central America and westward into the Pacific. In the middle of the century it had reluctantly been forced to extend its reach to Europe, and for much of the cold war, the security of Western Europe seemed to matter more than Asia or, indeed, the Caribbean. Gradually, however, the Middle East came to be the hub around which American strategy turned: because of Israel, because of oil, because of terrorism. [p. 131]

4. Splendid Multilateralism#

This chapter focuses on the United Nations and points out that the United Nations is completely dependent on the United States and "When it does legitimize American policy, it is positively useful. When it does not, on the other hand, it is no more than an irritant." (p. 135) "How many divisions has he?" comes to mind.

Part II - Fall?#

5. The Case for Liberal Empire#

Ferguson revisits much of the discussion of Empire and makes his case for why a 'liberal' empire that promotes free trade, free people and free institutions is a good thing. The primary difference in breadth from Empire is the explanation of how the world is much less "globalized" than it was during the reign of the British Empire because of massive amounts of tariffs and restrictions of trade and people in the world today. This could be cured by a willing America, he supposes.

6. Going Home or Organizing Hypocrisy#

Yet another reason what Americans what poor imperialists--unlike the British, they really mean it when they say they want to run elections and go home and not be involved in "overseas adventures." A major problem with this is that there is little incentive to change your ways as a terrorist or collaborate with the Americans if you know that they will be leaving you alone shortly.

This brings us to a critical point. It is simply that the time frame is the key to successful nation building. It is no coincidence that the countries where American military intervention has been most successful have been those in which the United States has maintained a prolonged military presence. As we have seen, President Bush is fond of citing Japan and West Germany after 1945 as examples of what successful American intervention can achieve. "America has made and kept this kind of commitment before,m" he argued in February 2003, drawing an implicit parallel with 1945. "After defeating enemies we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments." This overlooks the awkward fact that the formal occupation regimes lasted seven years in the Japanese case and ten in the West German, and that--even to this day--the deployments of American troops in those two countries remain among the largrerst anywhere in the world. [p. 216]

7. "Impire": Europe Between Brussels and Byzantium#

This chapter focuses on the European Union and looks at both sides of the debate over whether it can become a counter-weight against the American Empire, and Ferguson concludes that it cannot.

Europe's, in short, is a curious kind of union, a confederation that fantasizes about being a federation without ever quite become one. It has an executive, a legislature, an upper house, a supreme court, a central bank, a common currency, a flag and an anthem. But it has only a tiny common budget and the barest bones of a common army. Many more decisions than its architects intended are still taken by the national governments at meetings of the Council of Europe or at intergovernmental conferences. The EU lacks a common language, a common postal system, a common soccer team, even a standardized electric socket. To some critics--perhaps most famously the late Conservative cabinet minister Nicholas Ridley--it threatens to become a "Fourth Reich," not only dominated by Germany, but German in its institutional structure. To others--notably the Oxford professor of politics Larry Siedentop--it is the French who really run the union in the style of their own less than accountable bureaucracy, preventing its evolution into an American-style United States. Siedentop's EU is more like a third Bonapartist empire than a Fourth German Riech. [p. 254-255]

8. The Closing Door#

This chapters talks about some of the future problems for America, both domestically and as an empire. It is here where the article Going Critical: American Power and the Consequences of Financial Overstretch occurs.

Conclusion: Looking Homeward#

Three deficits of the American Empire:

• Economic Deficit, represented by its power foreign investment and internal financial problems.
• Manpower Deficit, represented by the quantity of military personnel and the propensity of Americans to preference to run Wall Street firms over colonies and governments.
• And, Attention Deficit, represented by the lack of will on the part of Americans to follow through with plans and occupations and the tendency to get jittery after even the slightest loss of life. Americans are simply unwilling to die and unwilling to commit to long-term plans.

A funny comparison in this chapter is between Arnold Swartzenegger as the Terminator and the United States.

In three distinct ways the Terminator is a perfect, if uniwitting, metaphor of American power. Though he has the body of man half his age, Schwarzenegger himself is in fact just four years short of his sixtieth birthday. His determination to remain forever Mr. Universe typifies the determination of an entire generation never to grow old, though grow old they must--with significant economic consequences. The Terminator is also a very American hero for the simple reason that there is only one of him. In this he personifies the chronic manpower shortage that current constraints American nation building. Above all, the Terminator exemplifies the limits of American power because the word ABORT starts flashing in his head before he has completed his mission. Outwardly, Arnold Swartzenegger is without question a colossus; it is hard to imagine the male body looking any bigger and stronger. He is to the human frame what the United States is to the capitalist economy. Yet his character embodies the three key deficits that explain why American only looks immensely strong with actually being immensely strong. [p. 289-290]

[...]

And this brings us to the final respect in which the United States resembles Arnold Schwarzenegger's Terminator. In military confrontations, the United States has the capability to inflict amazing and appalling destruction, while sustaining only minimal damage to itself. There is no regime it could not terminate if it wanted to--including North Korea's. Such a war might leave South Korea in ruins, of course, but the American Terminator would emerge from the rubble more or less unscathed. What the Terminator is not programmed to do, however, is to rebuild. In his wake he leaves only destruction. [p. 299]

My thoughts on American Empire...#

It seems to me that practically there exists a choice between allowing a rival power, however large or small, to conquer an area and destroy your interests there and not allowing this. While theoretically free capitalism and freedom are inevitable because of the unending devotion of men to them, even unconsciously, there is a decided benefit in having those benefits now, rather than later, if the cost of acquiring is less than the gain. For this reason, individuals may have an interest in the political and economic system in another part of the world being capitalistic.#

Would such a imperial mission be moral? It depends. To re-quote Ayn Rand's essay "Collectivist 'Rights'" from The Virtue of Selfishness, as quoted originally by Chip Gibbons:#

"Dictatorship nations are outlaws. Any free nation had the right to invade Nazi Germany and, today, has the right to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen. Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own self-interest, not of respect for the non-existent 'rights' of gang rulers. It is not a free nation's duty to liberate other nations at the price of self-sacrifice, but a free nation has the right to do it, when and if it so chooses.

This right, however, is conditional. Just as the suppression of crimes does not give a policeman the right to engage in criminal activities, so the invasion and destruction of a dictatorship does not give the invader the right to establish another variant of a slave society in the conquered nation. [pg. 104]

Thus if individuals in a free nation choose to hire mercenaries (or volunteer themselves) to invade and liberate a country, and then truly establish a free nation, then they are morally justified in doing so. This is because at home, they are not reducing freedom through taxation and coercion to fight; and overseas, they are actually creating the institutions of freedom. (Whether as a minarchist monopoly or private institutions.)#

Thus, self-interest may encourage the desire to trade with a people for goods and services. This may be prevented by the lack of freedom for said people. Which may be rectified by a liberation. Which may be morally justified it does not reduce freedom at home and if it actually establishes freedom abroad.#

By this argument I can recognize a case of liberal empire. How does this apply to America?#

America is not free, and you can be sure that an imperial mission would be support by taxation, would potentially involve conscription, would generally only initially benefit the government tag-along companies that received monopolies, and would involve a large amount of subjugation of the local peoples in the short-run. But, if we recognize the benefits of free trade in the long-run, then so should we in this instance. For this reason, Ferguson's study of the long-run results of British Empire represent that while it does not reason libertarian perfection, liberal empire can produce some of the best approximations: the United States (some what,) Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom itself.#

With this thought, I think that in the practical, possible situations of the modern era, American Empire could be a good if:#

• Domestic problems are solved--the clay feet of Social Security and Medicare.
• Free trade is truly embraced, rather than bilateral agreements, subsidies, and tariffs passed out however the pork falls.
• Americans see the benefits of the above and the benefits of a more productive global market, and use this foresight to justify to themselves liberal empire.

Richard Gwai Lo sent me the book So Many Books: Reading and Publishing in an Age of Abundance, by Gabriel Zaid, translated by Natasha Wimmer.#

This book looks at reading and books and contains the author's thoughts about the state of the publishing and reading world. Backed up by statistics for effect, Zaid attempts to make these points clear:#

• The publishing of books is at such an explosive rate that it is impossible to read any significant portion of them.
• This is not a bad thing, in and of itself, because most books are only interesting to a few people, and these people generally find the books they want to read.
• Reading itself is not always a desirable activity, morally or aesthetically speaking. Socrates famously disliked books because they are not as powerful or responsive as a real conversation.
• The only real problem this represents is that more people want to write books, than want to read them. Statistics related to academics are abound, as well as an interesting survey that found over eighty percent of Americans feel they should write a book.
• Books are the most versatile media form because they support blockbusters and experimentation--they promote wealth, diversity, and creativity. This is because the barrier to entry is so much less than a movie or a television program, and thus a book doesn't have to make as much money to be justified, and thus it does not have to appeal to as many people to be published. Thus diversity flourishes and hits are possible.
• Although not necessarily a problem, because it is sometimes solved, another issue with the deluge of books is finding the books that are right for you. A book may be perfect for three thousand people, but often times only two thousand find the book. Book advisors, book clubs, and "constellations" of readers and books are ways around this and they all have room for improvement. [I hope that my book-related blog activity helps readers find their books.]

So many books...#

Books are published at such a rapid rate that they make us exponentially more ignorant. If a person read a book a day, he would be neglecting to read four thousand others, published the same day. In other words, the books he didn't read would pile up four thousand times faster than the books he did read, and his ignorance would grow four thousand times faster than his knowledge. [p. 22]

Barriers to entry...#

Book people (authors and readers, publishers and booksellers, librarians and teachers) have a habit of feeling sorry for themselves, a tendency to complain even when all is well. This makes them see as a failure something that is actually a blessing: The book business, unlike newspapers, films, or television, is viable on a small scale. In the case of books, the economic threshold, or the minimum investment required to gain access to the market, is very low, which encourages the proliferation of titles and publishing houses, the flourishing of various and disparate initiatives, and an abundance of cultural richness. If the threshold of viability were as high as it is for the mass media, there would be less diversity, as is true of mass media. Let us suppose that only one of every hundred titles were published, but for readerships the size of film audiences. What advantage would that scenario offer? None at all, because those titles are already being published today: they're our bestsellers. [p. 26-27]

The lack of the all teaching importance of books:#

In a survey of reading habits today, Socrates would score low. His scant scholarship and his lack of academic titles, foreign languages, resumé, and published work would prevent him from competing for important posts in the cultural bureaucracy, which would confirm his criticism of the written word: The simulation and credentials of learning have come to carry more weight than learning itself. [p. 38]

Chances of finding a particular book...#

A good general bookstore carrying thirty thousand titles doesn't stock even 1 percent of all books available. Supposing the demand were the same for every title, the probability of the store not having a certain one would be 99 percent. If, under these circumstances, a strange arrived blind-folded to take charge of the store and responded "We don't have it" to any request, 99 percent of the time he would be right. [p. 102]

So...

We must take joy in fat, embrace it, celebrate it, explore bookstores in hope of a miracle. As Heraclitus said, if you don't expect the unexpected, you won't find it. In our wanderings across islands of overloaded shelves, on deserted beaches, and even in those floating garbage dumps that bob alongside piers, a fortunate encounter may come swimming along: the message in the bottle you've been waiting for. [p. 110]

Some thoughts...#

I found the discussion of how the real important thing about books is not how many you read or what you remember from them, but what conversations they allow you to be a part of and how you experience life afterwards. Part of me used to feel that I should keep out of the conversation until I was officially learned enough, but I don't think that makes sense anymore. You learn anything by doing it, if even in theory, rather than staring a book. Not that a book can't be a good teacher, but without utilization it is little more than nothing.#

As part of embracing conversations, in think speaking foreign languages is a clear advantage here. While I could generally find an English speaking person to talk to about any particular subject, an Arabic and Pushtu speaker is likely to have a different take on many things and I will be able to navigate a wider sea of memes.#

One thing I found lacking in this book was a discussion of the overlap in books. For example, reading books like Empire and The Wealth and Poverty of Nations make it possible to learn a great deal about certain subjects while avoiding the requirement of reading some hundreds of other books. By looking at the relations between books (due to citation and bibliographies) it is very possible to imagine a discussion of what books have the most 'bang for the buck' in terms of content.#

A final thought I had was related, of course, to blogs. Many of the things that Zaid writes about books could easily be applied to blogs. The entry point is even lower, both in terms of start-up capital, but even more in terms of the investment of the author. An blogger with only a few pages of thoughts every month is very unlikely to be able to put those pages in a mass-media outlet and equally unlikely to personally publish a few pamphlets. With a blog, small bits of writing can slowly build up. Also, this should have something to say about the quality of the most popular bloggers. They are not popular because they are overwhelmingly good, but because the appeal to a wide amount of people. (This of course, can be interpreted to mean that they are good if you measure 'good' in number of viewers, but critics of television do not seem to think this, so for analogy I do not assume it.)#