Earlier this week I finished reading The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (1988), by Shadia B. Drury, and found it immensely interesting. I hope to highlight some of the keys points of the book and clarify my understanding of it and its issues by contemplation.#

I will attempt to cover some general aspects of the book first so you can get a feel for it before I jump into the ideas.#

Leo Strauss. I feel I should first mention about who he is. Here is a starter Google Search. And this article talks about how he is the "father of Neo-Conservativism."#

Basically, Leo Strauss was (he is dead) a member of the department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He wrote many commentaries on great pieces of philosophical writing and from these commentaries a coherent philosophy can be extracted.

Some of his students are now serving in very high places in the US government (for example, Paul Wolfowitz and some of Rumsfeld's aides) so his ideas are seemingly very important these days--particularly when you see what they are.

Structure. I should describe the structure of the book and the "bias" of the author.#

The book consist of a introductory chapter on Strauss that is biased against him, then a neutral deciphering of his philosophy without commentary, and finally ten pages on how one might criticism him.

While I have not read any of Leo Strauss' work directly, it seems as though Drury's treatment is not biased against him. She simply seeks to explain his philosophy that is buried through his various works.

I, however, will not take this approach. I will interject constantly with Strauss either for or against him in various places, while also wondering about the details of my own philosophy.

Preface: Where Drury introduces Strauss and the technique of her treatment.#

This is a great introduction to the controversy surrounding Leo Strauss:

Leo Strauss is generally regarded as an historian of ideas, albeit a very unusual one. He has written many commentaries on the major figures in the history of political thought; among these are books of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Machiavelli, Spinoza and Hobbes. What is unusual about these works is that their author insists that all great political philosophers conceal their true thoughts or leave them unsaid. What the philosophers wrote clearly and explicitly was their exoteric philosophy, hiding behind which is their real and more complete esoteric philosophy. Straus therefor introduced a [method of interpretation] intended to unearth the hidden thoughts of the philosophers. The method he used seemed unusual: he attributed great significance to the numbers of chapters or paragraphs in a work, he focused on what was literally in the middle of a book to shed light on the heart of the matter, and he drew important conclusions from the silences of philosophers. It is not surprising that he has come to be regarded as a most enigmatic figure among scholars. What is most baffling of all is the number of young scholars eager to follow in his footsteps. [pg. ix]

Shadia explains that she will not use Strauss' technique of interpretation on his own work, although she is not sure that he has not hidden ideas this way. Instead she believes that to understand Strauss you must listen to him literally, she relates the story of the pious ascetic from Plato:

The pious ascetic is the symbol of the esoteric writer. he lies in deed or manner or style of expression, but does not lie in speech. It is my contention that Strauss is like the pious ascetic: if we are to understand him, we must learn to take him literally. Strauss's own noble lies, like the lie of the pious ascetic, are not simple falsehoods. They are misleading not so much because of what they say, but because of the pious manner that Strauss generally adopts when he makes his most radical statements. Moreover, what Strauss actually says seems to contrary to his reputation that we are inclined not to believe him. [pg. xi]

A way of thinking about this for me was to think that maybe the "devil's advocate" is actually the devil himself and believes the things he is saying. Also, I'm not sure what Strauss's "reputation" actually is, because the only times I've heard him mentioned are with references to this book. Further reading will probably be done.

I find this to be alright, because if Strauss does not actually believe or promote this philosophy that my commentary can be retroactively modified to say "the ideas of The Political Ideas of Strauss" because they are interesting regardless of whose mouth they come from.

In this chapter we see the first inkling of Leo Strauss's ideas: That philosophy and truth is not meant for all.

As I understand him, Strauss regards political philosophy as the hard outer shell that hides a soft kernel at its center. The soft kernel is philosophy, for which only the few are fit, whereas the many are harmed by it. Political philosophy is the public face of philosophy that hides the truth, not so much to avoid persecution, but in order not to wreak havoc on society, any society. [pg. xiii]

Every idea of Leo Strauss's relates to this fundamental conjecture. They either serve to prove that is true or they are implications of it being true.

Leo Strauss: Teacher and Philosopher: Mostly about the character of Strauss and how his influence developed, the style of his work, etc.#

As a prelude to his ideas, Drury introduces the first implication of the destructive nature of truth: If truth is necessary to rule and run a society, and it is only accessible to the few, then the few must rule over the masses.

For Strauss, the task of political philosophy in the world is to educate a special elite that will exert its influence in political life. Democracy understood as mass rule is for Strauss an absurdity simple because 'the mass cannot rule': history shows us that only elites have and can rule. Therefore it is necessary to 'found an aristocracy within democratic mass society'. Strauss and his followers believe that Plato's republic in which philosophers rule over the city is the best regime. Even though Strauss referred to this republic as a 'city in speech' [ed--Generally meaning "just an idea."], he did not mean that it is unattainable. he meant only that it is improbably because it requires the happy coincidence of philosopher and political power, or the existence of princes friendly to philosophy: it requires that philosophers win the ear of the powerful. [pg. 16]

The second part of this is where worry begins. If Strauss directly advocates influencing government, and it seems that Straussians are very successful within conservative circles, then the answers to certain questions become important:

What are they whispering in the ears of the powerful? How do they hope to change the world? What vision of a better world do they share? Unless we understand the political ideas of the man behind this fantastic project, the very meaning of the contemporary conservative movement will remain elusive. [pg. 17]

Esoteric Philosophy and Ancient Wisdom: Why Strauss writes esoterically and his interpretation of ancient Greek philosophers.#

One of Shadia's great talents and shows of integrity is the way that she does not seek to hide Strauss's ideas at all and tries to make them as clear as possible:

I will state more explicitly what Strauss expresses only with the utmost reserve, even in this [ed--Should be "the"?] most explicit of his statements on the matter. Esoteric writing is not necessary simply to protect the philosopher against harmful ignorance and bigotry. There is a deeper and more important reason that corresponds to a deeper and more important aspect of the conflict between philosophy and society. Philosophy does not only offend society, it 'endangers' it. There are two reasons for this. The simpler one is made explicit by Strauss, the deeper and more significant one is apparent only to one who understand the passage in the light of the corpus of Strauss's work. [pg. 19-20]

Those reasons are seemingly simple: Society cannot withstand the questioning of philosophy because it is based on 'noble lies' and illusions that are necessary for it to function properly.

Is there a truth so terrible that it threatens to wreak havoc on society unless it is kept secret? What is this deadly truth? Let me come straight to the point: in the course of this work I will show that for Strauss, religion and morality are two of the biggest but most pious swindles ever perpetrated on the human race. But paradoxically, there would be no human race were it not for these swindles. It is therefore of the utmost importance that they be sustained and nurtured. If this is true, then Strauss is right, philosophical truth is as deadly and as dangerous to society as he says it is. For surely, no society could survive in the absence of religion and morality. (As we shall see, Strauss believes that morality depends on religion.) [pg. 20-21]

Commentary and explanation on why Strauss believes this to be truth will be coming, but first one should become acquainted with what this means. Namely, that philosophy must be taught to create new philosopher-kings but it must be taught in a veiled fashion that does not disrupt the masses.

One method is to write esoterically and leave little holes in the wool that a bright mind may see and seek out to become a full fledged student of truth. Strauss, surprisingly, has advice on how to do this that Drury describes as "the best description of Strauss's work."

He would make the statement in the quiet, unspectacular and somewhat boring manner which would seem to be but natural; he would use many technical terms, giving many quotations and attach undue importance to insignificant details; he would seem to forget the holy war of mankind in the petty squabbles of pedants. [pg. 26, but quote is Strass]

So, why is religion and morality necessary to sustain society? People need fear of the afterlife as a way to control their actions when they think no one is watching. Contracts and laws created by men that are agreed upon can serve many purposes, but if they are seen only as faulty works of man then attempts will be made to break them and "get away with it." But, a Divine Law causes man to watch himself and it creates a fear that is beyond what man can do to man.

Let me summarize in more explicit terms what Strauss says only implicitly about Farabi's [ed--one of Strauss's ancient idols] philosophy. There is no life beyond this life. There is no happiness but the happiness to be found in this life. There is no transcendent God. Philosophers are as gods among men. The only happiness accessible to us is through the rule of philosophers. But the philosophers are neither loved nor recognized. On the contrary, they are despised and ridiculed. Instead, people wish to be ruled by the Divine Law. In their ignorance, they fail to recognize the shortcomings of law and its inability to accommodate the variable circumstances of human life. People are also ignorant of the absolutism of the Divine Law and hence of the sacrifices it will exact. If man is to be modestly happy, wisdom must replace law and philosophy must replace the dogged adherence to Sacred Law. [pg. 30]

The implication of wisdom versus law is that there are instances where Divine Law is not actually best, no matter what its content is. Another way of putting it, is that there is an exception to every law or rule that you can think of from a practical standpoint. An example that is used throughout the book is that Strauss sees it as necessary to allow the lynching of an innocent man to prevent a mob from destroying the city, because preservation of the city is more important than the single man.

Here is an interesting point about Strauss's beliefs and Plato's 'city in speech.'

Strauss is mistakenly regarded as one who maintains that philosophy provides us only with transcendent ideas that are politically unrealizable, unattainable and impracticable. Strauss has done much to perpetuate this kind of misunderstanding. He and his followers never tie of repeating that Plato's Republic, which they openly embrace as their political ideal, is a 'city in speech', a city that is politically unattainable. In the real city, the philosophers can rule, but only in secret, by having influence over the powerful. The open rule of the philosopher in the ideal city is replaced by the secret kingship of the philosopher in the real city. The philosophical ideal can only be attained by chance. It depends on the chance occurrence of princes friendly to philosophy. It is by no means beyond reach. [pg. 34]

Philosophy's Hidden Revolt against God: Since the core of Strauss's message is that the Divine Law is a lie that is necessary, Drury explains why Strauss sees God and the Divine as impossible or irrelevant.#

At the heart of the conflict is that the two recognize different and incompatible authorities: Nature and Tradition.

The natural is deemed to be even older that the ancestral and hence more authoritative. So much so, that the term nature came to be used as synonym to what is good and wholesome in contradistinction to the artificial, conventional, and unwholesome. But society cherishes its traditions and conventions because it believes them to have a divine origin, to have been founded by gods or sons of gods, or men to whom God has spoken directly. Strauss therefore identifies the ancestral with the divine code; so much so that he uses the two terms interchangeably. Philosophy therefore presupposes doubt of authority, not only human, but divine. [pg. 37]

Some may not see this conflict as legitimate:

It may be objected that Strauss's depiction of the conflict between faith and reason is highly artificial. It may seem that the conflict on which Strauss insists is one that is necessitate by his fallacious conceptions of the two antagonists. As contemporary Thomists have argued against Strauss and his followers, reason and faith need not be mutually exclusive. Properly construed, faith has its foundations in reasons: one must have reasons for believing. Why then must reason and faith be defined in ways that necessarily make them hostile antagonists? [pg. 39]

I am reminded of my comments to Chip Gibbons on Reason and Faith, where I argue that Faith can be supported by Reason and Reason depends on Faith (in Reason itself.) I did not read this book at that time, so I don't completely agree with those comments, but, they are of a similar nature.

One of Strauss's arguments is that the Bible itself defines religion as against philosophy or wisdom and casts the first stone:

In 'Jerusalem and Athens' Strauss develops the same thesis [ed--That the Bible is completely against reason and only for unconditional faith] even more fully. He describes the condition of man in the garden of Eden as devoid of evil, old age and death. Adam and Eve live happily knowing neither sorrow nor toil. Their life is also marked by a conspicuous absence of the arts and crafts. It is characterized simultaneously by simplicity and abundance. But it is a life lived under the tutelage of God. For Adam and Eve lived as children in the garden of Eden. They were forbidden to eat of the tree of knowledge but not of the tree of life. This means that they were to partake of eternal life as long as they were obedient to God. God's prohibition against eating of the tree of knowledge is a prohibition against the pursuit of autonomous or independent wisdom. Strauss understands it as a prohibition against philosophy, or the knowledge that man can attain independently by his own efforts. The first and most fundamental prohibition in Genesis is again declared to be a prohibition against philosophy. [pg. 42]

It is interesting to note that Strauss's problem with the Bible is just that it does not recognize the exception: That some people are fit for knowledge and others are not.

Strauss believes that the bible is right, this is the sort of life that is fitting for the many. Generally speaking, knowledge is bad for man, it threatens to destroy him. In the form of the arts, crafts and technology, knowledge threatens man with extinction -- a fact of which we are painfully aware in the twentieth century. But even though knowledge (at least in the hands of the many) is a hazard to life and happiness, man is nevertheless drawn to it by a sort of inexplicable eros. [ed--Intense love and desire.]

I am reminded of an argument in Dante's Purgatorio that suggests that all men are meant to attain knowledge of good and evil, that is the knowledge of God, but the fault in Adam and Eve was their impatience. Basically, I saw it as arguing that knowledge was meant to be attained through observation (a very philosophical idea) rather than participation. That is to say that the Bible and the story of Eden is a prohibition against contemplation and proud assurance of ones own authority. Because there is not authority or knowledge greater than God (identified with nature), to contemplate and be sure of oneself is to be sure that God is wrong or unnecessary. But God is defined as the Primer Mover, the point from which all things hang, meaning that everything and everything is dependent on him and Goodness.

Contemplation of a false nature, in this view of the Biblical view, is thus a perversion of the sight and intellect imbued upon Man by God.

Furthermore, this can be read to support Strauss as well. Because while this view supposes that all Men are given the opportunity to know God, it does not mean that all do--not every man is a saint and each man resides in Purgatory for a different length of time. Thus, philosophers of nature (rather than the false nature of the mind) are merely those who comprehend God more easily.

 

Back to Strauss though. A nice roundup of Strauss's position:

Philosophy and religion confront man with two incompatible lives. A choice must be made. Strauss portrays the choice as a choice between reason and unreason, freedom and subjection, happiness and sacrifice, greatness and humility. For intelligent men it does not seem a very difficult choice to make. A life lived in blind obedience to God is inadequate not only for anyone who aspires to greatness, but for one who yearns for the fulfillment or completion of his rational or genuinely human potentialities. Strauss implies by his account of man's transgression in Genesis that man is so constituted that he cannot help but choose knowledge even though the price he must pay for his choice is high. But he does not wish to disparage or undermine the simple life of faith. On the contrary, he agrees with the Bible that it is the most appropriate life, at least for the large majority of mankind. [pg. 48]

Here is a great comment of "reasons for faith," such as miracles:

Strauss allows us to draw the conclusion that the human experience of God does not constitute a shred of evidence for revelation.

What about the miracles? Strauss tells us that these are not a reliable source: 'no miracle was performed in the presence of first-rate physicists'. Besides, miracles were meant to impress idolaters, not atheists. The former are 'people who in principle admit the possibility of divine action'. Idolators are men who know fear and trembling, they are not atheists 'who are beyond hope or fear like philosophers'. [pg. 50]

But, philosophy is very similar in this regard. Philosophy is not generally meant for the religious--in fact, Strauss seeks to hide it from their view--and it is equally unqualified, at least in its contemplative form. How can one man have the same thoughts as another? It is impossible as Chip Gibbons indicates in Hamlet's Binary Circumstance:

If their perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and resulting actions were identical and occurred at the same point in time and space; they would be the same person

This is similar to the inability to transfer miracle experiences in any more than anecdotal form. The only truth experience that can be shared is that of objective reality--nature itself, not the meanings we put on nature or the astral plane of Forms. (And with regards to "not meant for the other," refer to the recent map of books bought by liberals and conservatives.)

 

So what does this conflict mean? To Strauss this conflict means that philosophy must be kept secret because it is the ultimate good, but it destroys that which sustains it: religion. Strauss argues that the ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle understood this, but the moderns do not and this a dangerous thing:

The single most fundamental difference between ancients and moderns is that the latter no longer believe in need or the necessity of esoteric writing. They have parted with the wisdom of the ancients in thinking that philosophical truths are wholesome for the masses and for society as a whole. If Strauss is indignant when he speaks of the 'moderns', this is due not so much to their atheism or their moral relativism, but to the public manner in which they present it. What he objects to is the foolishness with which they dispense philosophy as if it were the gospel. [...] That Western man no longer believes in the existence of God is a testimony to the failure of their project [to reconcile Reason and Religion]. The liberation of philosophy and its emergence into the public sphere has destroyed the latter. God is dead because philosophy has killed Him. [pg. 55]

In a fictitious dialogue between Strauss and Freud, where Freud is the representative of modernism, Freud says the following of Strauss's opinion of the importance of religion:

You overestimate the ability of religion to make men good. Men are not made more moral by religion. On the contrary, their weakness next to God gives them an excuse to sin, enjoy it and then do penance. It is time we replaced religious motives by secular or rational ones. The time is ripe for men to be brought up strong and clear-headed, without the bitter-sweet poison religion that leads to intellectual atrophy and makes them dead to reality. If men hope to transcend their infantilism or abandon their heavenly father as they must their earthly one, they need an 'education to reality' without which they cannot face a hostile world. [pg. 59]

But Drury argues that Strauss would not go for this solution:

[He] is not convinced that enlightened self-interest provides man with a sufficient motivation for virtue. One who accepts the argument that moral rules of civilization are beneficial can still maintain that it would be even more beneficial to reap the benefits of one's own injustice as well as those of living in a law-abiding society. [pg. 60]

The problem is that my greatest comes from breaking the rules while everyone else follows the rules, that is, if the rules are secular and do not imply an eternity of Hell for their breaking. Thus, if one does not have divine faith in the rules then they will not be followed. And philosophy is what removes this divine faith and gives the bearer the powers to measure the benefit of breaking them. Thus, when philosophy is released upon the masses, no one will follow the rules because they will seek to maximize their own benefit without regards to others: it is the tragedy of the commons.

Religion provides a means to values other above oneself and to make the punishment for breaking a rule effectively infinite so that there is not instance where a rule-breaking is beneficial to the individual.

Socrates and the Drama of Western Civilization: This chapter discusses why Strauss sees the ancients the way he does--that is, supporting his conjecture of noble lies and the conflict between religion and philosophy.#

Strauss believes that some of the ancients, such as Lucretius, do not support the tyranny of religion and Divine Law; Drury describes their Lucretius's take.

Lucretius believes that the terrors of the void are not as unbearable for ordinary humanity as people (like Strauss) are inclined to think. It is better to accept the mortality of our souls without delusion or rebellion, than to be gripped by the fear of Hades. The latter destroys our happiness and robs our pleasures of their sweetness. We are bound to be happier if we face up to the fact that the world is unsupported by wise and benevolent gods, and that there is nothing at the helm but the blind fury of the blind atoms. Man will be happier living in the face of the truth than in the grip of the terrifying delusions of religion. Lucretius embarks on a campaign against fear, and the intention is to liberate the minds of men from the terror of religion, and replace it with the 'sweet solace of life' which is philosophy. [pg. 64]

Strauss argues that Lucretius has failed and that any attempt to do so will fail when the reader can not appreciate the beauty of truth--as the vulgar masses cannot do.

However, his disagreement with Lucretius begins from a considerable base of agreement. He does not object to Lucretius's account of the origin of religion or its untruth, nor does he challenge Lucretius's account of the terrifying nature of the truth. Strauss questions the wisdom of the poet's activity. For Strauss, philosophy is the representative of the naked truth. True philosophers do not believe that the naked truth should be sweetened or made palatable. The only reason for sweetening it is to give it to children or those who are 'quite immature' and therefore unfit for it. The poet's activity is therefore foolish and dangerous. [pg. 66]

This paves the way into the philosophical conception of gods, whom the philosophers are closest to.

On the ancient view, real gods, if there are any, are self-sufficient. They do not suffer need. They neither love, nor need to be loved. Real gods are not benefactors of men. There is no reason to be a benefactor unless you wish to be loved. Allan Bloom put it more forcefully than his teacher when he declared that a god who loves without need (like the biblical God, I presume) is an 'imposter'! [pg. 69]

On what Strauss sees as Socrates' conception of Justice:

[...] Justice is an artificial device by which the city compels us to benefit our fellow citizens. [...] If the city is to survive, let alone flourish, it needs to cultivate the virtue of justice among its citizens. In view of this, nothing could be more salutary than the belief that the just are happy or that justice is in the interest of the one who is just. [...]

What Strauss learns from Plato is that there is nothing sacred about the rules of justice. Justice is simply a means to collective self-interest. It lacks universal validity in inter-group relations. The same rules that are useful to the preservation of the city, are necessary for the preservation of a gang of robbers, whose activities are in the service of manifest injustice. One cannot escape from this unpleasant reality by asserting that the city is just to all, while a gang of robbers is not. Everyone knows that the foundation of every city is in crime, and that foreign policy even in peace time requires espionage and other more sordid activities, because 'war casts its shadow on peace'. Political societies act much like gangs of robbers: they practice 'thievery' not against one another, but against the 'foreign enemy'. [pg. 77-78]

(Note: I referred to this the other day in response to Richard.)

Although this is a foreshadowing of a later topic, the non-existence of morality, I will give a little bit of a treatment on this specific nature of it, that is justice with regards to foreign relations.

To suppose that one country can act unjustly to another is to suppose that there is a universal metric by which a country's actions can be measured. This forces a single view of the world upon other countries and societies. Whether or not this law is based upon Divinity or not (that would only attribute to its success,) it does imply and endorse a world tyranny of right--one that can carry out the punishment for the injustice that it defines.

In this regard, Might Does Make Right, because if Right is an arbitrary concept that can be invented by anyone--whether they attribute it to God or not. Then its success depends on its ability to be carried out, which of course depends on the "might" of the bearer of justice.

A reflection on this leads to think that the United States is not attempting to create a hegemony over the rest of the world, it already has a de facto hegemony and is merely carrying out its conception of justice on the rest of the world with wars like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Classical Natural Right or the Teaching on Tyranny: This chapter discusses how the philosophers can benefit the city from the shadows--how they can rule and how they should go about ruling.#

Socrates was put to death when the amoral and apolitical nature of his philosophical life became apparent to his fellow citizens. If the philosopher is to redeem himself, he must, in justice as well as for the sake of appearances, make some contribution to the city: he must be compelled to return to the cave. But how could he possibly contribute to the well-being of the city since his truth is destructive of social life? The answer rests in the fact that philosophers, despite their shortcomings, are peculiarly fir for two tasks essential to the well-being of the city. First, their clever rhetoric (which enables them to make the weaker argument appear the strong), can serve the city by strengthening its noble fictions. Secondly, philosophers are particularly fit to rule because they are wise. But since the are unlikely to take or be given power, they can serve the state best as advisers those in power. What sort of political advice are they likely to give? To what standard will they appeal? For Strauss, their standard will understandably be derived from nature. They will regard political and legal justice best which comes closest to what is right by nature or to natural right. [pg. 90]

Strauss must first make the case that the philosopher needs the city, which I don't feel he does too successfully:

Since the good life according to nature, or the life of the philosopher requires leisure, it is impossible in the absence of civili society. Classic natural right does not therefore endorse the conventionalist denunciation of civili society as unnatural -- at least not without qualification. For Strauss, the city and its justice are natural to the extent to which they are directed to the perfection of man which is according to nature. Dedication to this exalted end alone redeems the city and raises it above the association of the gang of robbers.

From Jared Diamond and particularly his book, The Third Chimpanzee, we "know" that the average hunter-gatherer (the archetype of the cityless man) works only 12 to 19 hours a week. That does not provide enough leisure time for the philosopher?

I find it striking that all this talk of "living according to nature" completely throws out the possibility of actually doing it. Perhaps the justification is that the philosophers in question, notably Strauss, do not see it is a possibility that the current incarnation of civil society can return to their roots in nature.

And to any criticism of the hunter-gatherer, remember who invented language and the vast majority of all things that our current lives are based upon.

 

So, Strauss sees the philosopher's best place in society as the ruler or the advisor to the ruler because it preserves the life of comfort that the philosopher enjoys which would otherwise be threatened by the dissolution of society that he would cause. Thus, the ideal form of government for the Straussian is one that listens to the philosopher--not one that listens to everyone:

According to Strauss, Xenophon's message is this: the wise do not despise tyranny for the same reasons others find it objectionable. In other words, they do not object to the forceful or fraudulent way the tyrant came into power; nor do they object to the innumerable crimes he has committed; nor to the fact that he rules in the absence of law. What they despise about tyranny is what they despise about every form of government -- namely, its failure to listen to the counsel of the wise. The wise are not so naïve as to think that political affairs can be devoid of force, fraud and injustice; nor are they naïve enough to think that a particular form of government is best. Magistrates are not made good rulers by being duly elected; nor does a king posses the art of governing simply because he has inherited his crown according to the accept rules of succession. How one acquires power makes no difference. 'Constitutional rule', or acquiring power by constitutional means, is not essentially more legitimate than tyrannical rule. Any rule is legitimate only to the extent that it 'listens to the counsel of the wise'. Knowledge is alone the true title to rule. [pg. 96]

I am reminded in this passage to many parallels who would probably not wish to be spoken of in the same breath as Leo Strauss. François-René Rideau writes about the illogic that supposes a constitution to be some how more reasonable than a tyrant's rule. Open Society advocates do not despise tyrannies for their particulars, but because they do not support change and learning. Many Libertarians recognize that all governance is founded upon "force, fraud and injustice." (Although they do not then suggest it to be a good thing.)

Machiavelli's Subversion of Esotericism: The beginning of the discussion of modernism, where the ancient wisdom of esotericism is left behind in favour a "truth that will set you free."#

For Strauss, Machiavelli represents one of the first who set the stage for Modernism by being open and honest with the means to assert political power. Strauss does not condemn his ideas, merely the way he describes them openly, for being honest about them makes it more difficult to carry them out.

Machiavelli on Christianity and religions:

Unless men are appeased by religious hopes and frightened by religious fears, they would be less likely to defer to the ruling class, and society would be in a state of constant turmoil. Machiavelli believes with Marx that religion is the opium of the people. BUt unlike Marx, Machiavelli believes that the opium will always be necessary because of the unchanging nature of both men and the world. The world is characterized by scarcity, whereas human desires are limitless; as a result, they crave a satisfaction that is impossible. Religion is useful for curbing man's unlimited cravings, hence making them moderate enough to be satisfied with the little that politics can realistically offer. [pg. 122]

And Strauss's criticism of Machiavelli:

Machiavelli's dissemination of philosophy to the masses opens the way to the Enlightenment, nay, it is identical with Enlightenment. Enlightenment is 'the project' of modernity par excellence: its goal is to fight against the Kingdom of Darkness. It believes falsely, that mass enlightenment is the solution to man's political dilemmas. Moreover, this modern project is conceived as a conscious and heroic effort on man's part to take control of his destiny and to master Fortuna. According to Strauss, Machiavelli replaces the biblical God with Fortuna, and the Christian idea of providence with the modern idea of not trusting to chance, and taking one's fate in one's own hands. Having deposed both God and chance, man becomes the sole master over nature; his destiny depends only on himself. The result is the technological society where man's inventions have become his masters and his destroyers. [pg. 131]

Hobbes and the Character of Modernity: Hobbes is seen as the founder of modernity, while Machiavelli merely sets the stage. This chapter discusses the problem of modernity, which Strauss sees as the fundamental problem today.#

Drury explains the nature of the biggest problem today:

One of the central themes of Strauss's work is to analyze the character of 'modernity' and explain how it ultimately led to the 'crisis' of our time. If we are to understand Strauss, we must examine what he means by 'modernity' and by 'crisis'. Although he does not express it this way, his view can described as follows. A civilization is not made of oak and rock but of individuals. Its foundation is in the hearts and minds of men. Its health depends on the psychic health or depravity of its constituents. A civilization is healthy when it is inspired by an idea, a purpose and a project that animates all those within its compass. A civilization begins to decline and decay and ultimately vanishes when the individuals within it no longer believe in the idea or ideas that are its guiding light. For Strauss, 'modernity' is not essentially an historical or chronological category. It refers primarily to the set of ideas that in the last two hundred years have gained ascendancy and become the guiding light and inspiration directing Western civilization. The crisis of modern Western civilization consists in the fact that these ideas have now lost their power; we no longer believe in them. This is not altogether surprising, for the ideas that have been our guiding lights were ill-conceived from the start. Disillusioned, we are beginning to wander aimlessly; and this aimlessness is symptomatic of an impending catastrophe. [pg. 133]

The guiding light of modernity attempts to guide Western civilization to an era of equality, freedom and justice. One where each person is without want from possessions or freedom and none can take that away from him. The argument is that because nature is inherently unequal, any attempt to "beat nature" will be bound to fail because nature is the all powerful. Whether nature will be destroyed in the process, however, is not certain.

To achieve this goal, the moderns suppose a better way of organizing society and do not think to use the 'noble lies' of the ancients.

Plato had taught that even the best legal organization and the best set of laws will fail to provide even a modestly just society unless these laws are inscribed in the hearts of citizens. Citizens inclined to take advantage of loopholes in the laws will spend their days making more laws to remedy the loopholes of the old laws and then newer laws to remedy the new laws ad infinitum. The process would be as hopeless as cutting off a hydra's head -- twelve more will grow in its place! [pg. 138]

You see this happening a great deal with the taxes in America. One group creates a strange way to collect them, one group distorts it to make more loopholes, and so on and so forth.

The problem, as Strauss sees it, is that justice does not know equality and ultimate freedom for every man. He refers to that wisdom of the ancients, particularly the myth of Prometheus as told by Protagoras.

The myth teaches the hard truth that our society is only as good as ourselves, and that there are no easy solutions or magical cures to political problems. Technical skill or the mastery over nature cannot replace the mastery over oneself. No society can exist in conditions of peace, order and harmony without just individuals, or individuals willing to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the collective good. No amount of technical skill in the arts and crafts that are conducive to 'commodious living' can possibly save us from annihilation if we are unjust. [pg. 140]

Although not meant to be read like this, I find that this paragraph supports opposition to liberals who seek to find a magical political cure to problems like health care, poverty and hunger. They suppose that if they magically force everything to give up money and pay for these things it will be okay, rather than cultivating the values that they see themselves possessing and organizing means of paying for these things out of their own pockets. The message of the paragraph is two fold: That to change the world we must change ourselves; and, A society must be founded on a teaching that cultivates sacrifice. I'm not sure I agree with the second, but I agree with the first.

The modern liberals seek not to create a teaching of sacrifice, but to make it involuntary--transmuting it into thievery. But how did the ancients construct this teaching that cultivated sacrifice?

The ancient secret to the socialization of the individual was well understood by Machiavelli. He explained that selfish ambition is the key to social success. The pursuit of honor and glory was the ancient way of mobilizing selfishness for the sake of the common good. Machiavelli railed against Christianity because its private or feminine conception of virtue deprived the state of the salutary effects of the heroic or manly virtues and so rendered the state weak. [pg. 146]

With regards to the comment in the passage on the weakness of Christianity, refer to Don Park's conjecture that Islam uses 'jihad' as a cultural immune system. A way of protecting the civilization from outsiders who would destroy it. Very relevant.

The Crisis of Modernity: Modernity being accurately describes, Drury goes into more depth about why Strauss feels it causes a crisis in Western civilization.#

Another expression of the requirement that society has on noble lies:

Society requires entrenched opinions, certainty and unquestioning loyalty. Only in this manner can it hope to elicit conformity, obedience and voluntary compliance to the laws of the community. In contrast, the philosopher must 'follow his own genius with sincerity'. [pg. 153]

This discussion revolves around Rousseau who Strauss credits with describing the "first" crisis of modernity. Rousseau on the role of philosophers in the city.

Despite the danger that philosophy poses to the city, Rousseau believes, with the ancients, that it could be made to serve the city in a useful and even necessary capacity. For example, philosophy can be useful to a corrupt society: it can discover 'palliatives' for the 'prevailing abuses', it can undermine the sacred dogmas and ultimately lead to the collapse of a bad city. In other words, philosophy is a good for a bad society, but bad for a good one. After the revolution, it must retreat, it must remain the hidden preserve of the few 'great geniuses', 'privileged souls' or 'true philosophers'. It is good for the latter, but bad for 'the peoples' or 'the public' or the 'common men' or 'les hommes vulgaires'. But all this is true only of popularized philosophy or the diffusion of the scientific or theoretical aspect of philosophy. There is another aspect of philosophy that can be useful even to a good society. If we distinguish between two parts or aspects of philosophy, we can see how philosophy can be made useful to the city, not just in times of corruption, but at all times. [pg. 155]

The two parts being 'metaphysics' or true philosophy and 'Socratic wisdom' or political philosophy. The first is the highest good that philosophers are rewarded with and the second is the tool that the noble lies are spun with that preserve the city for the benefit of all. (But disproportionally towards the philosophers.)

And this political philosophy is necessary and needs to the skill of wise because it is difficult to do:

The problem of political society is that man does not by nature submit to the collectivity or give up his interests for the sake of the whole. He must therefore be 'collectivized', made virtuous, or fit for society. But the process by which he is so transformed involves continuous obfuscation. However, the success of the process depends on forgetting that the transformation is possible only through myth and obfuscation. As Nietzsche maintained, forgetfulness is necessary for life. Philosophy recommends the substitution of its own sober wakefulness for a forgetful stupor. And this, to say the least, is highly paradoxical. [pg. 156]

An interesting note here on modernity, it is not something that is only carried out by one group (ie, the small-d democrats are just as modern as the communists.)

Both the United States and the Soviet Union aspire to world dominion: they want to subdue the world and make it prosperous. According to Strauss, this goal is expressed in the term 'underdeveloped nations': 'the expression implies the resolve to develop them full, i.e. to make them either Communist or Western, and this despite the fact that the West claims to stand for cultural pluralism'. The Americans believe that the whole globe has to be democratic if it is to be safe for Western democracy. It seems that the pluralistic ideology of the West is a fraud, though not a particularly pious one. [pg. 159]

But as you recall, Strauss is not concerned with whether the ruler who listens to philosophers is a tyrant or not, so it matters not that the United States is not as altruistic as it hopes us to believe. And in fact, he makes this very clear:

For Strauss, the dream of the universal and prosperous society is dangerously close to the horror of modern tyranny. The universalism of modernity and the 'unlimited or uncontrolled progress of technology has made universal and perpetual tyranny a serious possibility'. The Nazis are a case in point: their brand of universality was a peculiarly rooted one--it was a universality that failed altogether to reach any level of pluralism, it failed to transcend its rootedness in German soil. Strauss does not think this is an isolated phenomenon, as is evidenced by his criticism of American pluralism, or its lack thereof. The American desire to make the world safe for democracy is potentially as oppressive as the German desire to make the world ready for the maser race. For Strauss, planetary rule, no matter what form it takes is oppressively tyrannical. Universalism and pluralism do not so much succeed in transcending natural human rootedness, they only pervert it. [pg. 161]

The other major of modernity is its nihilism--the belief that are values and systems of belief are equal, equally worthless. The problem is that people must believe in the values of their society if they are expected to fight for it.

Men will always live in separate societies characterized by mutual hatred, antagonism and animosity, fueled by an irrational attachment to their own culture, customs, and ways. War will always be with us. We must be satisfied with the little consolation of ancient wisdom according to which politics is the art of transforming natural man into citizen, and this requires constant vigilance and reinforcement, not to mention noble lies and obfuscations. The state must appear to be supremely honorable, nay, sacred. This 'protecting atmosphere' (Strauss borrows the phrase from Nietzsche) is necessary for political life; it is necessary if some men are to sacrifice their lives for the safety and security of others. By exploding the 'protecting atmosphere', nihilism has threatened the political life of Western civilization. [pg. 168-169]

Post-Modernity: Plato or Nietzsche?: The next problem for Strauss is how to solve the problem of modernity and create a post-modern world, how to repair the cracks of nihilism.#

The body of this chapters suggests that by following the work of Nietzsche and attempting to create something like The Republic of Plato, who Strauss regards both as post-moderns, can the situation be repaired. This is why it is important for the Straussian to seek political power and influence... to save the civilization that supports him.

Esotericism Betrayed: Drury gives a brief survey of what the Straussians have been up to after the departure of their teacher and master.#

What is apparent is that Strauss's students disagree with each at very fundamental levels about what Strauss believed. Drury explains this as them being taught literally different things.

Strauss's students testify to the fact that Strauss followed the example of his Socrates by speaking different to different students. In his memorial to Leo Strauss, Ted A. Blanton said that Strauss spoke to different people differently, telling each what he believed they needed to hear. It is important to understand that speaking differently to different people does not mean expressing the same truths to all in different ways or using different language or metaphors depending on the ability and inclination of the one being taught. It means literally teaching different people different things. [pg. 188]

And the reason this is so is because Strauss thought that the city needed to types of people: the philosophers and the statesmen; or the hidden rules and the true rulers.

The Wise and the Vulgar: A Criticism of Leo Strauss: Shadia B. Drury takes this last moment to criticize the ideas of Leo Strauss.#

The prime complaint Drury has against Strauss is his elitism, his serious distinction between the wise and the vulgar.

What is unfortunate is that Strauss corrupts; and that, more than the power of his intellect, is the source of his attraction. Strauss seduces young men into thinking that they belong to a special and privileged class of individuals that transcend ordinary humanity and the rules applicable to other people. In criticizing Strauss, I focus primarily on the vulgar nature of his vision of the philosopher-superman. [pg. 193]

Drury also sees the indifference to justice of the ruling class to be a practical problem in running a successful country with the assumption that modern countries depend on the respect of others for their well-being. (The assumption is that not all countries would be run by philosopher-kings.)

The greatness of cities, like the honor and reputation of individuals, depends on the regard and admiration of others. And it is highly unlikely for even the mightiest of cities to be admired for being truly great if it displays a callous indifference to justice. The most powerful nations in the world know that they will not be admired or counted as truly great unless they are perceived to use their power in ways that do not simply serve their own ends. This is why they goto such lengths to justify their injustices by appealing to standards that are universally recognized. They will describe an invasion of a small and relatively helpless nation as the liberation of a people from the rule of an oppressive tyrant. They will attempt to justify a war of aggression by accusing the other party of striking the first blow. [pg. 197]

On Strauss elitism again:

It is ironic that the 'young men who love to think' and who are destined to become the heirs of Strauss are characterized by their willingness to accept Strauss's authority without question. Strauss has subtly taught them that the wise recognize these truths instantly, to question them is by definition to remove oneself from the elect. This seems particularly comical in view of Strauss's definition of philosophy as that which rises up against authority. [pg. 201]

Reflection from Me: I describe some thoughts about Strauss's ideas and the ideas of my own.#

I plan on coming back to this post in the future. But some of the questions that this leaves open in my mind are:

• Is civic life truly necessary for leisure and happiness?
• Does a city necessitate governance?
• Does even a libertarian society have the same nobles lies and crimes at the heart of it that other societies are described to have?

The main problem is that I unable to see why Leo Strauss is fundamentally wrong. I agree with Drury that his brand of elitism is very difficult to measure and quantify, and because of its secretive nature it is not clear that the representative philosopher are truly wise and nor just a intellectually hereditary monarchy of the line of Leo. (Because presumable the new rulers would be chosen by the old ones, the first of which being Leo.) The other place one could argue with Strauss is whether the nature of the masses can change to be conducive to a prosperous life to all who cooperate.

I think that last point is whether the liberals and the libertarianism split up. The liberals think that the nature can be changed so that everyone works for everyone, while the libertarians think that the nature can be changed so that everyone works for themselves, without hurting anyone else. One seeks to maximize power in the hands of everyone, the other seeks to remove power from the hands of anyone. And across the field are the conservatives who seek to place power in the hands of the few, this time chosen for their wisdom or propensity to listen to the wise.